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FROM ILLEGALITY TO ACCEPTED REALITY :
ANALYSING THE IMPACT OF YHE I.C.J.S ADVISORY
OPINION ON THE WALL IN PALESTINE
- NEHA SACHDEV*
In this article, the author examines the history, controversy and
present status of the Wall or Security fence being built by Israel
in the occupied territories of Palestine. The article analyses the
judgments of the International Court of Justice, the Israeli High
Court, as well as developments in various international arenas, to
conclude that in spite of repeated declarations of the illegality of
the Wall in international law, its construction continues unabated.
Besides the lack of legal reasoning given by the I.C.J. in its advisory
opinion which has contributed to this situation, the article concludes
that the grave human rights violations caused by the Wall are not
just being tolerated but perhaps even being acquiesced to by the
international community today.

I.

Introduction

The recent unilateral pull out from Gaza and four West Bank settlements by
Israel has been hailed by many1 as major turning point in the achievement of the
roadmap peace process between Israel and Palestine.2 However, even as crowds

* IV Year, B.A.LLB. (Hons.) Student, National Law School of India University,
Bangalore.
1

See,e.g.,Arye Mekel, Why Israel will Pull out of Gaza, August 15, 2005, available at,
http://www.nydailynews.com ; Tim Butcher, Israelis begin pull-out from Gaza,
September 16, 2005, available at, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/08/16/wmid 16.xml; Rice Says Gaza Pullout Best
Chance for Peace, June 18, 2005, available at, http://archives.tcm.ie/breakingnews/
2005/06/18/story207755.asp

2

The roadmap is the latest in the peace making efforts, and is a performance based
strategy to a permanent two state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, being
undertaken by the United Nations, United States, Russia and the European Union. It
consists of three stages. In Phase I, the aim is to end terror and violence, normalizing
Palestinian life and building Palestinian institutions. In Phase II, which is termed as
a transition phase, efforts would be focused on the option of the creation of an
independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty,
based on a new constitution, as a way to a permanent status settlement. In the final
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in Gaza rejoice at the Israeli disengagement, there continues to be a major
contentious issue between the two parties, which is a real threat to the viability
and stability of any future Palestinian State: that of the Security Wall being built
by Israel.3 This paper examines the history, conflict and present status of this
Wall under International and Israeli domestic law, with a specific focus on the
right to self defense and its ambit in International Law. Furthermore, it aims to
show how despite the almost complete withdrawal from Gaza by Israel, the
geographical location and economic consequences of the Wall continue to cause
unparalleled hardship and deprivation to the people of the occupied Palestine
territories. 4
To this end, the initial part of this paper provides a brief background of the
Israel-Palestine conflict as well as the developments that lead to the construction
of the security wall. Part III discusses the opinions of both the International
Court of Justice (I.C.J.) and the Israeli Supreme Court on the question of the
legality of the Wall. Rather than delving deep into issues of jurisdiction, the
focus will be on analyzing the respective judicial opinions on the crucial point of
the violation of human rights of the Palestine people versus the self-defense
concerns of the Israelis. Subsequently, the paper will go on to examine the
developments in the International arena, both within and outside the United
Nations, which have resulted in the present situation of the continued violation of
every possible norm of International and Human Rights Law, pointing out to the
fact that the issue of the Wall today is being dictated by the demands of realpolitik
rather than well established principles of international law.

stage, the aim is to arrive at a permanent status agreement, and taking into account
actions of both parties and with monitoring by the quartet. The Security Council in
Resolution 1515 in 2003 has endorsed this strategy. The Roadmap: Full Text, available
at http://www.bbc.co.uk (last visited September 1, 2005).
3

The Wall has been called the Security Fence by the Israeli Government, the
Wall by the International Court of Justice, and the Separation Barrier by the
Secretary General to the United Nations. It consists of a smart fence designed to keep
out all infiltration to the Israeli side. In this article the terms have been used
interchangeably. See Alberta De Puy, Bringing Down The Barrier: A Comparative
Analysis of The I.C.J. Advisory Opinion And The High Court Of Justice Of Israels Ruling
On Israels Construction Of A Barrier In The Occupied Territories, 13 TUL. J. INTL & COMP.
L. 275, 278 (2004).

4

The term occupied territories includes the portions, which were occupied by Israel
after the 6- day war in 1967 with Jordan, consisting of West Bank, Gaza and East
Jerusalem, and included all territories which were included as being a part of Palestine
under the British Mandate of 1949. As stated by the I.C.J., nothing since then has
altered the position of Israel being the occupier of hostile territories. See Advisory
Opinion No. 131, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. 131, at ¶ 78. (Hereinafter Advisory Opinion).
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A Brief Historical Overview of the Israel-Palestine
Conflict and the Construction of the Wall.

In order to clarify the background and events which led to the decision by
the Israeli cabinet to build this security wall, a brief overview of the conflict
between Israel and Palestine would be imperative at this stage. At the end of the
First World War, Palestine was entrusted to Great Britain under the Mandate
system of the League of Nations, and in 1947 Britain announced that it would
unilaterally withdraw from all the territories by May 1948. In the meantime, the
General Assembly had through Resolution 181, recommended a plan of partition
of the territories into a Jewish and an Arab state, and while the Arabs opposed the
resolution, Israel proclaimed its independence as a state in May 1948. This led to
the first armed conflict between Israel and the Arab states, due to which the Plan
of Partition was not implemented. In 1949 through a series of U.N. mediations the
so called Green Line was fixed between Israel and Jordan.5 However in 1967, in
the Six-day War between the parties, Israel occupied all the territories which
constituted a part of the British Mandate in 1947 and while the Security Council
unanimously adopted a resolution confirming the illegality of the occupation, the
same has continued unabated.6 As was emphasized by the International Court of
Justice and will be elaborated upon later in the paper, nothing had altered since
then, and Israel remains formally in occupation of the Palestinian territories in
question.7
Coming to the events which directly led to the construction of the Security
Wall, in 2002, in the aftermath of a fresh series of terrorist attacks on Israel,
following the failure of the Camp David talks,8 the Israeli government began
construction of a Wall that ran close to the 1949 Green Line, between Israel and
the West Bank. According to Israel, the sole purpose of the fence was to prevent
terrorist infiltration, especially suicide attacks, and the fence was termed as a
temporary structure to be destroyed once this purpose was fulfilled.9 This fence

5

In 1949, a series of general armistice agreements were signed between Israel and the
neighboring States through mediation by the United Nations. In particular, one
such agreement was signed in Rhodes on 3 April, 1949, between Israel and Jordan.
Articles V and VI of this Agreement fixed the armistice demarcation line between
Israeli and Arab forces, and this line is often referred to as the Green Line owing to
the colours used for it on maps. Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 77.

6

Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 73, 78.

7

Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 78.

8

Alberta De Puy, supra note 3, at 279.

9

Israel Diplomatic Network, Official Statement of Israeli Foreign Ministry (Mar. 17,
2004), available at http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il/ (last visited September I, 2005).
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was in the form of a barrier of an average width of 50 to 70 meters, consisting of
not just concrete wall, but also ditches, boundary wires, and buffer zones. 10 It
involved the mass seizure of land and property of Palestinians for the construction
of the fence11 and while earlier the route for the fence was supposed to be adjacent
to the Green Line, in 2003, controversially, the Israeli Cabinet voted for an
expansion of the project wherein large parts of the fence would intrude up to 7.5
kilometers into the West Bank, surrounding around 16% of it totally.12 As a result
of this construction, around 3,90,000 Palestinians will eventually live in
completely encircled territories, with a new administrative regime restricting
movements of residents outside the enclaves in some places.13 For instance, in
Qalqiliya, which is an enclave of around 40,000 residents and is already completely
surrounded by the Wall, movement outside is regulated through a single gate
which is open only between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. 14 Due to the portions already
constructed, thousands of Palestinian farmers have been separated from their
lands and source of irrigation waters, which has resulted in reduced agricultural

10

Furthermore, on the external side of the fence is an anti-vehicle obstacle used to
prevent vehicles from slamming into the fence to break through. In addition to
concrete or metal barriers in certain segments, there is an electric fence with a
number of roads on the internal side, including, a dirt road (for the purpose of
discovering the tracks of those who pass the fence), a patrol road, and a road for
armored vehicles. The average width of the fence is fifty to seventy metres. Where
there are topographical constraints, a narrower separation fence, consisting of an
electronic fence and components to support it, is used instead. De Puy, supra note 3,
at 278.

11

The case of Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel, H.C.J. 2056/04, as
discussed in the next section of this paper, pertained to a group of complaints by
villagers contending that the seizure of land from them to build the Wall was illegal.
In this context the Israeli Supreme Court discussed the legality of the fence, and its
route.

12

The rational for the same was that Israeli military advisors wanted a buffer zone
between the Fence and the Green Line so that terrorists who crossed the fence could
then be pursued without harming Israeli settlements. Further placing the fence
close to Israeli settlements would not solve the problem of infiltration. See Beit Sourik
Village Council v. Government of Israel, H.C.J. 2056/04. This area has also been
referred to by the I.C.J. as the closed area, as it lies between the Green Line and the
Wall. See Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 85.

13

For Israeli settlements in these encircled areas, movement outside these gates is free
without any permits. See Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 85. This system,
combined with a vast network of Jewish only roads which have been established
in these areas, right outside the walled areas, have led to Palestinian groups terming
the fence as an Apartheid Wall. See www.stopthewall.org (last visited November
3, 2005).

14

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, INCLUDING PALESTINE ¶ 9, E/CN/2004/6.
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production and massive food security problems in the region. 15 In urban
settlements, people have to walk miles to cross gates in the walls to be able to go
to work, and are cut off from basic amenities like schools, hospitals and local
markets.16 Furthermore the gates are open only between restricted hours. In the
time since the Wall has been built, according to a World Bank report, a large
number of shops, businesses and people have moved out of these regions,17 which
has led to one of the worst economic recessions in recent years in any modern
economy. 18
The widespread anger against this move by Israel led to the Palestinian
representative to the United Nations raising the issue in the General Assembly,
where a resolution19 was passed asking for an advisory opinion from the I.C.J.
regarding the legal consequences of the Wall, and whether the same constituted a
violation of international law.20 While there were predictable protests from Israel

15

See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ISRAELI PRACTISES AFFECTING HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND OTHER ARABS OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ¶ 26, A/58/311; REPORT BY THE
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE RIGHT TO FOOD ¶ 49,
51, E/CN.4/ 2004/10/Add. 2.

16

According to the Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations as submitted
to the I.C.J., in 2003 alone, 30 localities were already separated from health services,
22 from schools, 8 from primary water resources and 3 from electricity works.
Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 133. See generally REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR
OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN OCCUPIED ARAB
TERRITORIES, INCLUDING PALESTINE ¶ 9, E/CN/2004/6.

17

Reports issued by the UN also indicate that a large number of people were leaving
areas behind the Wall, and businesses were shutting down. See UNITED NATIONS REPORT
¶ 51, E/CN.4/2004/6; UNITED NATIONS REPORT, E/CN.4/2004/10/Add.2. See generally
Human Rights Watch, Israels Separation Barrier in the Occupied West Bank,
available at http:// hrw.org/english/docs/2004/ 02/20/isrlpa7581.htm. (last
visited on September 1, 2005).

18

The Report discusses in detail the causes of widespread recession, one of the worst in
recent years, blaming the same on the widespread system of closures in the economy
inserted by Israel, and has proposed its solutions after consultations with both the
Israel government, as well as Palestinian representatives. WORLD BANK REPORT, STAGNATION
OR REVIVAL? ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AND THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, December 1, 2004,
available at, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Data/
20751555/EMR.pdf (last visited on June 12, 2006)

19

G.A. Res. 10/14, U.N. G.A.O.R., 10th Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/14
(2003).

20

The question was framed thus: What are the legal consequences arising from the
construction of the Wall built by Israel, the occupying power, in Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including those in and around East Jerusalem, as described in the report
of the Secretary General, considering the rules and principles of International Law,
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as to the resolution, and then the jurisdiction of the Court; as will be analysed in
the next section, the Court in its opinion hinged the determination of the legality
of the wall on the question of Israels right to self defence, rather than on any
formal requirements of jurisdiction.

III. The Wall as a Measure of Self Defence: Comparative
Analysis of the Decisions of the International Court of
Justice and the Israeli Supreme Court
A.

Opinion of the International Court of Justice.

Despite protests by Israel and the United States, and the subsequent
appearance by Israel only to contest the jurisdiction of the I.C.J.,21 the Court, in a
long drawn discussion on whether it should exercise its jurisdiction, ruled that
the General Assembly was competent to refer the matter to it, even though the
Security Council was involved in the conflict at large.22 Significant however was
the examination by the I.C.J. of whether the exercise of its jurisdiction was indeed

including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council
and General Assembly Resolutions? Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 66. It must
therefore be remembered that the I.C.J. did not take upon itself the task of
determining the status of those parts of the Wall that were being built inside Israeli
territory. Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 67.
21

Israel made submissions to the I.C.J. only opposing the exercise of such jurisdiction,
and not on merits. In fact, one of the arguments raised against exercising jurisdiction
by the I.C.J. was that since the Wall was a part of a larger conflict, and Israel had not
submitted to the jurisdiction of the I.C.J., this action would be bringing the state
under its jurisdiction without its consent. This objection was dismissed by the I.C.J.
on the ground that the opinion was asked for by the General Assembly, was not
binding on any party and in any case state consent was not a prerequisite for exercise
of advisory jurisdiction. Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 46-50.

22

The argument raised was that such a reference for an advisory opinion by the General
Assembly contravened Article 12 of the United Nations Charter which provides that
While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the
functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make
recommendations with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council
so notes. The I.C.J. held that in recent years, the practice of the General Assembly
has shown that the words functions assigned to it has been interpreted to mean
functions assigned to it at this moment, and in fact there were many instances of
the General Assembly and the Security Council taking parallel action on conflicts.
While the latter concentrates on matters of international peace and security, the
former takes note of the broader humanitarian, economic and social considerations.
Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 25-28.
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judicially proper.23 The question that arose was whether the issue referred to it by
the General Assembly was a legal question,24 because if not, there would exist
compelling reasons for it to refuse to give its opinion.25 The I.C.J. dismissed the
contention that since the question referred to it was a part of longstanding conflict
it could have political overtones, and thereby the Court should not exercise
jurisdiction.26 This was done on the grounds that the Israel-Palestine conflict was
a responsibility of the General Assembly,27 and hence the I.C.J. as a principal
organ of the U.N. had the responsibility and duty to give the opinion asked for.28
Furthermore, it refuted the contention that the question posed to it was abstract

23

It must be remembered that there is a distinction between whether the I.C.J. has
jurisdiction with respect to the Advisory Opinion, and whether it should in its
discretion exercise the jurisdiction, as Advisory jurisdiction is essentially a
discretionary jurisdiction of the Court, and according to Article 65 of the Statute of
the I.C.J., The Court may give an advisory opinion. Advisory Opinion, supra note
4, at ¶ 43.

24

As per Article 96, paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter, and Article 65,
paragraph 1, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, an advisory opinion
can be sought only on a legal question. See also Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at
¶ 36-42.

25

Even though the I.C.J. has the discretion to refuse to give an advisory opinion, as
was stated in the case of Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996(I) I.C.J., at ¶ 14, the I.C.J. is the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations and an advisory opinion in principle presents an opportunity for it to
participate in the functions of the organisation and should not be refused, unless
there existed compelling reasons to do so. Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 4345.

26

Another related argument raised was that because of the political situation and the
complex nature of facts involved, the Court did not have the necessary factual
information to decide on the question, and hence should in judicial discretion decline
to give the opinion. The I.C.J. dismissed this contention on the ground that it had
lengthy submissions made by other States even though Israel had not participated
at the stage of merits, and it had a dossier of information supplied to it by the Secretary
General of the United Nations. Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 55-58. Judge
Buergenthal dissented from this on the ground that there were just too many complex
factual interpretations to be made by the I.C.J., which it was not competent to do
because of lack of material. Separate Opinion of Judge Buergenthal, Advisory Opinion,
supra note 4.

27

However, it conceded that it was mindful that its determination might affect the
political situation at large, and it would take that into account when rendering its
decision. Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 53-54.

28

It cited General Assembly Resolution 57/107 of December 2002, where the General
Assembly had described its responsibility towards the conflict as a permanent
responsibility towards the question of Palestine until the question is resolved in all
its aspects in a satisfactory manner in accordance with international legitimacy.
Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 49.
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in nature, requiring considerable interpretation by the Court to determine the
scope of the question posed. It held that the question was clearly directed to the
legal consequences arising from the given factual situation, considering the rules
and principles of International Law. According to the I.C.J., the question was
framed in terms of law, raised problems of international law, and was by its very
nature susceptible to a reply based on law. It was therefore held to be a legal
question. Further, lack of clarity would require interpretation by the Court, which
the Court had faced on several occasions, and hence, it was not a reason by which
the Court could be deprived of jurisdiction.29
Coming to the decision of the I.C.J. on merits, the Court first clarified the
nature of the territories in question by categorically holding that under Article
42 of the Fourth Hague Convention, a territory is considered an occupied
territory when it is actually placed under the authority of a hostile army, and
since in the present case the situation in the territories under scrutiny had not
changed since 1967, these remained occupied territories. 30 Hence it declared
that international humanitarian law was applicable to these territories,31 and the
construction of the Wall and its associated regime were violative of both the Geneva
Convention32 as well as the Hague Regulations. The Court was especially critical of
the covert Israeli policies of changing the demographic composition of these
areas over the years, and in fact construed the Wall as the latest Israeli attempt to
force Palestinians to move out of their settlements.33 The Court went on to hold

29

Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 37.

30

Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 78.

31

Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 89-101. It also declared that the Israeli settlements
in the Occupied Territories were against International Humanitarian Law. Israels
position on this point has always been that International Humanitarian Law is not
de jure applicable to these territories as these territories, before the 6-day War in
1967, were under the control of Jordan which had not signed the Convention.
However relying on extensive contrary state practice, as well as observing that
International Humanitarian law could not be limited in such a way, the I.C.J. held
that these territories also had the protection of the Hague rules.

32

The construction of the Wall led to the destruction of Palestinian property, which is
contrary to the provisions of Article 46 and 52, Hague Regulations, 1907, and Article
53, Geneva Convention. It further cited other provisions of these Conventions, like
the duty on the occupying state to restore as soon as possible, public order and life in
the occupied territories, to show how Israel had violated the same. Advisory Opinion,
supra note 4, at ¶ 132.

33

Such transfer of population is in fact prohibited strictly by Article 49, paragraph 6,
Fourth Geneva Convention. The I.C.J. also reaffirmed that such practices had already
been condemned by two Security Council resolutions, namely Resolution 446 of
1979 and Resolution 465 of 1980. Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 134. For
further comments on the judgment on the issues of International Humanitarian
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that international human rights treaties34 like the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights(I.C.C.P.R.) and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights35 were applicable to the occupied territories, even if a
territory was not under the sovereignty of a State, as long as the State exercised
jurisdiction on the subjects in some way.36 Accordingly, the Wall and its chosen
route violated a number of provisions in these Conventions,37 including the right

Law, see Ardi Imseis, Critical Reflections on the International Humanitarian Law Aspects
of the I.C.J. Wall Advisory Opinion, 99 AM. J. INTL. L. 102 (2005); David Kretzmer,
The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of International Humanitarian Law, 99 AM.
J. INTL. L. 88 (2005).
34

The conflict was whether during times of conflict and military occupations, human
rights treaties were applicable extra-territorially, and this raised a conflict between
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. The Court
itself clarified that the protection of human rights treaties does not cease to exist
during such periods, except so far as provided in Article 4, I.C.C.P.R. As regards the
relationship between these two bodies of Law, the Court opined that some matters
are exclusively of International Humanitarian Law, other exclusively of Human
Rights Law, and yet others may be situations which are governed by both, see,
Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 106. However this position has been criticized on
the grounds of firstly being doctrinally confusing and secondly moving away from
the real intention of human rights treaties which were never meant to apply in
situations of armed conflict. See Michael J. Dennis, Application of Human Rights
Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation, 99 AM. J.
INTL L 119 (2005).

35

The Court cited a number of provisions like the right to work (Article 6 and 7),
protection accorded to family and to children and young persons (Article 10), right
to adequate standard of living including the right to food, clothing and shelter (Article
11), right to health (Article 12) and the Right to education (Article 13 and 14) of the
International Convention for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Advisory Opinion,
supra note 4, at ¶ 112, 130.

36

Article 2, I.C.C.P.R. states that Each state party to the Convention undertakes to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction . In this context, the Court observed that while the jurisdiction of a
state was primarily territorial, it can be exercised outside the territory of a state,
and considering the object and purpose of the I.C.C.P.R., the Court would construe it
to apply to a state even if the actions take place outside its territory. Advisory Opinion,
supra note 4, at ¶ 108. As regards the International Convention on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, the Court held that a state could have control over a territory,
yet not exercise sovereignty over it. Considering that Israel had for over 37 years,
exercised control over these territories it was unwilling to accept its position that the
Convention was not applicable to them. Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 112.

37

Other rights included the right to freedom of movement, which is a part of Article
12, I.C.C.P.R. While reasonable and proportional restrictions can be imposed in public
interest, the I.C.J. found that the restrictions imposed by the Wall were
disproportionate in nature. Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 136.
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to self determination of the Palestinian peoples,38 and the right to equal access to
places of religious significance.39 Significantly, the Court pointed out that while
Israel had assured it that the Wall was only a temporary security measure, it was
influenced by fears that such a construction was a tool to further de facto annex
land, which might convert it into a permanent feature.40
However in its most controversial ruling, which was in essence the crux of
the case, the I.C.J. denied Israel the right of self defence against Palestine, under
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.41 It did so by limiting the right to self defence only
when there is a threat from one state to another, and argued that since Palestine
was not a state, the defense under Article 51 would not be applicable. It added
a second qualification that since the attack in question did not come from a
territory outside Israel, the recent Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and
1373 (2001) passed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks would not be applicable
in the instant case.42 Furthermore, since the Wall was not the only way in which
terrorist threats could be reduced, and there were other options available to
Israel, the I.C.J. opined that the plea of necessity would not excuse this violation
of international law.43
The I.C.J. therefore concluded that Israel was bound under international
law to cease the construction of the Wall, as the same was a violation of
international law.44 Going a step further, the Court invoked the concept of an erga

38

Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 88.

39

The Court included this within the ambit of Article 12, I.C.C.P.R., and further
historically traced the right to equal access to these Holy places from both the British
Mandate for Palestine, as well as General Assembly Resolutions passed in this context.
Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 129.

40

Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 121.

41

Article 51, U.N. Charter states: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of self-defense or collective self defence if an armed attack occurs
against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

42

Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 139. The Court used the latter reasoning to deny
Israel the protection offered by Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373
(2001), which relate to terrorism.

43

Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 140. The Court relied on the conditions stated in
Article 33 of the International Law Commissions Articles on State Responsibility, as
well as the case of Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J.
40, at ¶ 51.

44

The Court noted that Israel is obliged to fulfill all its international obligations with
respect to the Wall, and therefore is bound to respect the right of self-determination
of the Palestinian people, and its obligations under international human rights law
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omnes obligation45 and held that all states were under an obligation to not recognize
this illegal situation, to not give any aid or assistance in maintaining the situation,
and to ensure that this situation of illegality comes to an end.46 It asked the U.N.,
especially the General Assembly and the Security Council, to consider what further
action could be taken to put an end to the illegal situation resulting from the
construction of the Wall.47

B.

Opinion of the Israeli Supreme Court

Contrasted against this approach, is that adopted by the Israeli High Court
in the case of Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel,48 where the
High Court was petitioned by a group of villages whose land was being taken away

and International Humanitarian Law. It was also bound to ensure the freedom of
access to holy places that came under its control after 1967. Israel had to thus stop
the construction of the Wall, further dismantle all the parts of the Wall already
built, and was also obliged to make reparations for all the damage caused by the
construction of the Wall, restitute immovable property, and if that was not possible,
provide adequate compensation. Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 149-153.
45

As indicated by the I.C.J. in the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited,
Second Phase, Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 32, at ¶ 33, erga omne obligations are obligations
which are by their very nature concern all states and in view of the importance of
the rights involved, all states can be held to have a legal interest in their protection.
See N. RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES (1997).

46

Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 159. The Court evoked this principle based further
on the fact that it had already declared that self-determination is an obligation erga
omnes, in East Timor Case, 1995 I.C.J. 102, at ¶ 29. The Court also relied on the case
of Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996(I) I.C.J., at ¶
14, where it had stated that obligations derived from International Humanitarian
Law also constitute obligations erga omnes. It must be remembered that this was a
point on which the decision was taken thirteen votes to two with Judges Kooijmans,
and Buergenthal voting against the proposition. There have also been jurists who
have criticized this particular portion of the opinion as taking the advisory jurisdiction
of the I.C.J. into an activist stance. See Michla Pomerance, The I.C.J.s Advisory
Jurisdiction and the Crumbling Wall Between the Political and the Judicial, 99 AM. J.
INTL. L. 26, 39 (2005).

47

Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 160. Further, the I.C.J. emphasized that the
U.N. needed to double its efforts to resolve the disputes by implementing General
Assembly and Security Council resolutions passed on the conflict, and it endorsed
the roadmap effort which was the latest move in this direction. It concluded by
adding that the opinion rendered in its advisory capacity must be placed in the
larger context. Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 161-163.
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H.C.J.
2056/04,
available
at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/eng/verdict/
framesetSrch.html (last visited September 1, 2005).
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for constructing the Wall. Taking note of the judgment rendered by the I.C.J., the
High Court for the first time admitted that international humanitarian law indeed
applied to the Palestine territories. This was a significant departure from the
standard Israeli position. However, the Court also pointed out that it was convinced
that the separation fence as a whole was motivated by security, not political
considerations.49 It went on to test the route of the fence on the delicate balance
between the military necessity of the occupier and humanitarian concerns of
the occupied.50 Deriving the concept of proportionality from both international
as well as Israeli administrative law, the Court examined the route of the fence on
the basis of first, whether it had a rationale connection with the objective of
security sought to be achieved; 51 second, whether it caused the least possible
injury to the people affected; 52 and lastly, whether such injury was
disproportionate to the security benefits of the fence.53 Finding that in seven out
of the eight instances the choice of route of the Wall was such that it caused

49

Id. at ¶ 28.

50

Id. at ¶ 34. It must be remembered that this is significantly the first occasion that an
Israeli Court had admitted that the Occupied Territories are governed by the Law of
Belligerent Occupation, and since Israel was a party to the Fourth Geneva Conventions
and the Hague Protocol of 1907, the case applied the same. This is a significant
departure from the usual stance of the Israeli government, which has consistently
sought to deny the people of the occupied territories the protection of International
Humanitarian Law. Id. at ¶ 23.

51

The means that the administrative body uses must be constructed to achieve the
precise objective that the administrative body is trying to achieve. The means used
by the administrative body must rationally lead to the realization of the objective.
This is the appropriate means or rational means test. Id. at ¶ 41.

52

According to the second subtest, the means used by the administrative body must
injure the individual to the least extent possible. In the spectrum of means, which
can be used to achieve the objective, the least injurious means must be used. This is
the least injurious means test. Id. at ¶ 41.

53

The third test requires that the damage caused to the individual by the means used
by the administrative body in order to achieve its objectives, must be of proper
proportion to the gain brought about by that means. That is the proportionate
means test (or proportionality in the narrow sense.) The test of proportionality
in the narrow sense is commonly applied with absolute values, by directly
comparing the advantage of the administrative act with the damage that results
from it. However, it is also possible to apply the test of proportionality in the narrow
sense in a relative manner. According to this approach, the administrative act is
tested vis-à-vis an alternate act, whose benefit will be somewhat smaller than that of
the former one. The original administrative act is disproportionate in the narrow
sense if a certain reduction in the advantage gained by the original act  by employing
alternate means, for example  ensures a substantial reduction in the injury caused
by the administrative act. It is the latter leg of the test that the Court placed great
emphasis on. Id. at ¶ 41.
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disproportionate violations of the human rights of the affected villagers, it ordered
the changing of the route of the fence based on the above principles.54 In fact, all
future construction of the Wall and its routes were henceforth directed to be
governed by this three pronged test laid down by the Israeli Supreme Court.

C.

Comparative Analysis of the Two Opinions and the Balance
of Self Defence

While legal scholars lauded the decision of the I.C.J. as a welcome activist
stance by a usually restrained and politically correct Court,55 its legal reasoning
on self defence in the words of Judge Higgins words herself was a formalism of an
uneven handed sort.56 This is because, as she pointed out, the right of self defence
under Article 51 is not exhaustive of the right, and even otherwise, the wordings
of the Article do not contain any restriction that the attack must have come from
another state.57 In fact, the Caroline Incident,58 which is the standard authority
used by jurists while discussing self defence in customary international law,
involved the use of force by non-state actors. This qualification was added by the
Court in the Nicaragua case,59 where it nevertheless recognized that military
action by irregulars could constitute an armed attack if these were sent by or on
behalf of the State and if the activity because of its scale and effects, would have
been classified as an armed attack . . . had it been carried out by regular armed
forces.60 This explicit requirement for an attack by another state is therefore an
even more restricted interpretation of the right of self defence, which, as has been
argued by authors, is totally unsuited to the post 9/11 era.61
54

Therefore, the Court did not at any stage examine the macro effects of the fence at
large on the basis of its three-pronged test, but only the route of the fence as it
affected the particular petitioners. It further must be mentioned that the High Court
did not at any stage seek to substitute its own judgment for the military commander
who had decided the routes of the fence, which would imply choosing between
different military options. On the contrary, the decision was based on whether the
same satisfied the test of proportionality between the injury caused and the objectives
to be achieved. Id. at ¶ 48.
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Richard A. Falk, Towards Authoritativeness: The I.C.J. Ruling on Israels Security
Wall, 99 AM. J. INTL. L. 42 (2005).
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Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 34.
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Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 35.
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Murphy, infra note 67, at 65.

59

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v.
United States), 1986 I.C.J. 14.

60
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Id.
Murphy, infra note 67, at 67.
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It was in response to this question that the Court therefore dealt with
Resolution 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) and dismissed the claim on the ground
that in those conditions the attacks emanated from outside the territory of the
state concerned.62 At a factual level this can be disputed since in these cases while
the training and financing of the terrorists took place outside the United States,
the actual attack took place within the boundaries of the U.S. Furthermore, the
statements made in the Security Council in the aftermath of the attacks in no way
limited the application of these Resolutions to any specific situation.63 As Higgins
pointed out in her dissent, just because the territories are in the occupation of
Israel did not imply that Israel as an occupying power does not have the right to
protect its civilians from attacks from within the occupied territory. In fact it has
the duty to ensure public order under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations.64
Significantly, Higgins also pointed out that it was patently unfair that the occupied
territories were being considered as sufficient international entity to be invited
to the proceedings, and benefit from the application of humanitarian law; but not
a sufficient entity to be able to put forth an armed attack which required self
defence. 65
This restricted interpretation and the terse analysis given to self defence
has attracted criticism by many states as there was not even a mention of
Palestinian terror attacks in the opinion. This criticism was even cited as a reason
not to endorse the opinion by States in the General Assembly. 66 Hence,
respectfully, even though the final conclusion reached by the I.C.J. in terms of
declaring the Fence illegal is a recognition of the grave human rights situation
caused by the Wall, its legal reasoning could have hinged on a more detailed
factual and legal analysis of the proportionality and necessity of the means adopted
by Israel, rather than carving out what many believe is an artificial limitation to
the right to self defence.67 This is especially significant due to the fact that since an
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Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 139.
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Murphy, infra note 67, at 66-69.
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Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 36.
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Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 36.
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Even the final resolution passed by the General Assembly while endorsing the opinion
rendered by the I.C.J., put qualifications by recognizing that Israel did in fact have
a right to proportionally defend itself against attacks by terrorists. Fr. Robert J.
Araujo SJ, Implementation of the I.C.J. Advisory Opinion- Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory: Fences (Do not) Make Good
Neighbors, 22 B. U. INTL L. J. 349 (2004).
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The view of the I.C.J. regarding self defence has been criticized by many jurists in
international law on the basis that it gives a very narrow view of Article 51, bringing
into it qualifications which the article does not contain and which are completely
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advisory opinion is not binding on any party in international law,68 its value in the
development of international law, as well as its acceptance is dependent on the
depth and cogency of the argument presented by the Court.
On the other hand, the stance taken by the Israeli Supreme Court is a
comprehensive and sound legal strategy, as it held that actions taken to protect
the security of a nation cannot be disproportionate to the injury caused to those
affected by such actions, especially since the means adopted is not the only option
available. Unfortunately, the Israeli Supreme Court applied this proportionality
test to only the route of the Wall, that too in the specific instances of violation
presented before it, and not the Wall as a whole. It thus failed to take into account
the macro effects of the Wall on any future Palestinian State, as well as the combined
effects of such physical restraints on the current state of the political and economic
life of the Palestinian people. Hence, its effect was limited as this narrow
perspective only led to the route of the Wall being taken back to the drawing
board.69 The concept and construction of the Wall as a whole continued unaltered,
as long as the Government was able to satisfy the tests laid down by the Supreme
Court.

against the present need to thwart terrorism around the world. See generally Ruth
Wedgwood, The I.C.J. Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Security Fence and the Limits of
Self Defense, 99 AM. J. INT L. L. 52 (2005); Sean D. Murphy, Self Defense and the
Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit From the I.C.J., 99 AM. J. INTL. L. 62
(2005); Rebecca Kahan, Building a Protective Wall Around Terrorists- How the
International Court of Justices Ruling in the Legal Consequences of the Construction of
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Made the World Safer For Terrorists and
More Dangerous For Member States of the United Nations, 28 FORDHAM INTL L. J. 827
(2005). Another factor that has not been pointed out by authors is Article 51 of the
UN Charter gives the right of self-defense only in till the time that the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
However, in its recent opinion on the armed intervention of Uganda in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, the Court has further restricted its interpretation of Article 51 so
as make the condition of attack by one state against another state as a precondition
to the very question of self-defense arising in a case. Hence, going by its subsequent
clarification, the very fact that in the instant case there was no attack from another
state would preclude the Court from going into questions like till when did this right
exist, was it necessary or proportional in the circumstances. See Case Concerning
Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v.
Uganda), December 19th, 2005, General List No. 116, available at http://www.icjcij.org, ¶ 145-147.
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KENNETH JAMES KEITH, THE EXTENT OF THE ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 195 (1971); 2 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 499 (Leo Gross ed.,
1976).
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See Geoffrey R. Watson, The Wall Decision in Legal and Political Context, 99 AM. J. INTL.
L. 6 (2005).
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IV. From Illegality to Accepted Reality
Even though an advisory opinion is not binding in law on any party,70 it
constitutes an opportunity before the I.C.J. to interpret and further develop
international law.71 The function of an advisory opinion is to help an organ of the
U.N. perform its functions in a more purposeful manner.72 Even though the I.C.J.
itself rejected the fear that its opinion would ultimately have no effect in
practicality,73 in reality the subsequent events after the Wall decision have proved
those very fears true.74
Soon after the I.C.J. decision, the General Assembly in its reconvened session
took note of the opinion rendered by the Court, but made suitable modifications
including calling upon Palestine to cease all terrorism against Israeli citizens.75
The Resolution therefore termed the Wall as a violation of international law, and
put an obligation on all states to consider measures to put an end to the illegal
situation, specifically calling upon the Security Council to consider the matter
urgently.76 However, the positive action taken typically stopped here, as even
though a resolution was moved in the Security Council to tear down the Wall, it
was predictably stopped by the United States by using its veto power.77
Thereafter, the construction of the Wall has continued unabated with almost
25% of the Wall already completed. Evidence of the attitude of treating the Wall as
a fait accompli was that the Secretary General of the United Nations Mr. Kofi

70

Id.

71

Michla Pomerance, The Advisory Role of the International Court of Justice and its
Judicial Character: Past and Future Prisms in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS FUTURE
ROLE AFTER FIFTY YEARS 271 (A.S.Muller et al eds., 1997). An advisory opinion would
also constitute a secondary source of law under the Article 38 of the Statute of the
I.C.J., i.e. as opinions of imminent jurists. See, 3 SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTISE OF
THE I NTERNATIONAL COURT , 1920-1996 1755 (1990).

72

ROSENNE, Id. at 1756.
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Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at ¶ 62.

74

In fact, according to many a jurists, this opinion would lead to the lowering of the
prestige of the Court, and such strident activism goes against the very nature and
function of the I.C.J. See Adam M. Smith, Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?: The
Wall Decision and the Troubling Rise of the I.C.J. as a Human Rights Court, 18 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 251 (2005).
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Annan on his recent visit to Israel declined to comment on issue of the Wall.78
Glaring also, is a report issued by the World Bank on the state of the Palestinian
economy and its drastic recession in December 2004. While the report rightly
blamed the network of closures, significantly the security barrier erected by Israel,
as a major cause of economic recession in the area, its proposed solutions for
revival are based on the assumption that the Wall is indeed a harsh reality that
has to be accepted.79 It further calls upon international donors to finance the
installation of high tech electronic gates in the Wall to facilitate movement across
the security barrier, which is obviously in blatant violation of the I.C.J. judgment.80
Thus, the Wall, which has been declared to be against international law by the
I.C.J., and which continues to violate every possible human right of the Palestinian
people, is today a harsh but accepted reality to be negotiated between the parties
themselves. 81
The events after the Gaza pullout, which was much applauded in the
international community, 82 further highlights this accepted illegality in
international relations today. The question that naturally arises is why is the
issue of the Wall still a glaring violation of international law even after the Israeli
pullout from Gaza? The reason is that even though almost free from Israeli control,
Gaza is today completely encircled by high walls. Permits are required by
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Available at www.stopthewall.org (last visited September 1, 2005). Please refer to
this website for further discussions, reports and opposition to the Wall.
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WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 18. See also Palestinian National Authority, Ministry
of Planning Policy Research Unit, The Annexation and Expansion Wall: Impacts and
Mitigation Measures, available at www.psgateway.org/download/1872/
Wall_report.doc. However, another opinion has been expressed by jurists that the
very positive obligation imposed by the I.C.J. on third states is by itself ambiguous
and has in fact created this prickly situation for International donor agencies which
do not know whether helping alleviating the misery caused by the Wall will in fact
lead them to violate international law. The Palestinians contend so, as for them the
need for such aid would not arise unless the situation created by the Wall itself did
not exist. Thus, opinion points out that the I.C.J. should have created a distinction
between not rendering aid or assistance in maintaining the situation and rendering
humanitarian assistance which is needed by the Palestinians. Ardi Imesis, supra
note 33, at 117.
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The only qualification added by the Bank is that since the legality after the I.C.J.
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situated on the Green Line. WORLD BANK REPORT, Id.
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Palestinians venturing outside even for daily labour. The local population is
separated from social services like hospitals, schools. Farmers have been
separated from lands that lie outside, as well as from access to water resources,
resulting in a sharp drop in food production in this region. After the pullout, using
the argument that the Palestinians were free to administer themselves in the region,
the gates to the Walls surrounding Gaza have been closed most of the times, with
movements even more restricted and unpredictable than before. This has ensured
that in spite of little Israeli presence in Gaza after the pullout, the network of walls
and barriers all around it have made it a virtual prison for a population of over 1.3
million.83
As far as the West Bank is concerned, even after the rerouting by the Israeli
Supreme Court, the Wall will lead to almost 47% of land being de facto annexed by
Israel. Combined with rapid settlement activities by Israel in the area, this has
caused wide spread apprehension that such a temporary security measure will
soon turn into a permanent situation on the ground, significantly hampering
Palestines bargaining currency in any future negotiations between the two. Gaza
and the West Bank are considered widely as the two integral parts of any future
Palestinian nation, and as of today due to the network of concrete Walls, barriers
and Jewish-only roads, there exist no communication links between the two
areas.84 Thus, the Wall with all its accompanying infrastructure and economic,
social and political consequences, threatens the viability and stability of any future
Palestinian state, making it dependent on Israel for its very survival.

IV. Concluding Remarks
The Wall has today become a self-fulfilling prophecy, the more it succeeds
in preventing terror, or is seen as doing so, the more likely the possibility of its
permanent existence. The current administration in the closed areas, as well as
the far reaching demographic changes have led many to fear than the most likely
conclusion of this controversy will be the drawing of the final borders between
Israel and Palestine as determined by the Wall today.85 Above all, the continued
construction of the Wall, its virtual acceptance by the U.N. as fait accompli, and
international aid from institutions like the World Bank to make the Wall more
user friendly, are prime examples of the facile nature of international law and
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institutions today. The controversy surrounding the Wall, the initial momentum
in the international community to try to declare the construction as illegal, followed
by the subsequent actions of the same countries to manage the illegality is a
reflection that self interest rather than any moral ideology governs the domain
of international relations.86
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This is perhaps a practical illustration of the realist school of international relations
as expounded by Morgenthau, who argued that the concept of self interest, defined
in terms of power, is the only way of looking at international relations. MORGENTHAU,
POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (1997).
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